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NO HARM, NO FOUL:
HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN
GROUND ZERO CENTER FOR NON-VIOLENT ACTION V.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
ESSENTIALLY WEAKENS THE EIS AS AN
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM OF NEPA
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of the Navy (the Navy) operates
a nuclear submarine program known as “TRIDENT.”1  Through
TRIDENT, the Navy equips submarines with nuclear ballistic mis-
siles and utilizes them as a central part of the United States’ “strate-
gic nuclear deterrent Triad.”2  TRIDENT’s Pacific fleet is stationed
at Naval Base Kitsap in Bangor, Washington, where missiles at-
tached to submarines undergo routine maintenance at a facility
known as an Explosives Handling Wharf (EHW).3  During the
1990s, the Navy upgraded the missiles used on their TRIDENT sub-
marines.4  Although the upgraded missiles represented an improve-
ment to the program, they required frequent maintenance as they
aged, which the Navy recognized would eventually place a heavy
operational burden on the base’s EHW.5
The Navy’s efforts to alleviate that burden through the con-
struction of another EHW prompted resistance from numerous ad-
vocacy groups, including Ground Zero Center for Non-Violent
1. Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 860 F.3d
1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing Navy’s TRIDENT submarine program).
2. Fact File, TRIDENT II (D5) Missile, AMERICA’S NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/
navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1400&ct=2 (last visited Feb. 26, 2018)
(noting how TRIDENT contributes to United States’ nuclear deterrence strategy).
The strategic nuclear deterrent Triad is a national security policy that was devel-
oped by the United States in the 1960s that promoted the development and main-
tenance of three “nuclear delivery vehicles.”  Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf.  Those vehicles originally included
long-range missiles based in the territorial United States, long-range missiles on
submarines, and heavy bombers. Id. at 1.  The United States developed the policy
during the Cold War period to deter a Soviet attack. Id. at 1-2.  The United States
reduced its nuclear triad arsenal after the Cold War, but continued to maintain
and modernize the remaining weapons. Id. at 4.
3. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1248 (describing activities at Naval Base Kitsap).
4. Id. (discussing missile upgrade in 1990s).
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Action (Ground Zero).6  Ground Zero, an organization dedicated
to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, emerged in 1977 in
direct response to the construction of the Washington naval base.7
Since its establishment, Ground Zero has consistently protested the
presence of nuclear weapons on the base and worked to stop the
continued development of the TRIDENT program.8  Part of
Ground Zero’s advocacy work operates through litigation of the
Navy’s TRIDENT program activities.9  The focus of this Note is one
example of Ground Zero’s advocacy of non-violence through the
use of the judicial system.10
In Ground Zero Center for Non-Violent Action v. United States Depart-
ment of the Navy (Ground Zero II),11 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered the latest challenge by Ground Zero against an
action proposed by the Navy to further develop its TRIDENT pro-
gram.12  Despite Ground Zero’s efforts to use this case as an advo-
cacy tool, the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the Navy.13
Although the Ninth Circuit issued several rulings, this Note ana-
lyzes only the Ninth Circuit’s holdings with respect to two of the
Navy’s alleged violations of federal environmental law: first, the
Navy’s failure to disclose appendix information upon the original
release of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) the Navy was
required to produce under the National Environmental Policy Act
6. The Trident Nuclear Weapon System, GROUND ZERO FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION,
http://www.gzcenter.org/learn-more/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (summarizing
subject of organization’s advocacy).
7. See About Ground Zero Center, GROUND ZERO FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION, http:/
/www.gzcenter.org/learn-more/ground-zero-center/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
(describing founding of organization).
8. Id. (listing Ground Zero’s activities in relationship to TRIDENT program).
9. See id. (describing Ground Zero’s advocacy through “strategies and tactics
for nonviolent campaigns”).
10. See generally Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of
Navy, 383 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing court’s decision regarding previ-
ous action brought by Ground Zero against Navy).  For a further reading of
Ground Zero’s advocacy through interactions with the judicial system, see Category
Archives: Legal, GROUND ZERO FOR NON-VIOLENT ACTION, http://www.gzcenter.org/
category/legal/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (listing articles related to Ground
Zero’s legal battles with Navy).
11. 860 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating court’s opinion for Ground Zero II
case).
12. See generally id. at 1248 (describing case on appeal originally brought by
Ground Zero against Navy for recently proposed action).
13. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings, see infra notes 45-
50 and accompanying text.
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of 1969 (NEPA); second, the Navy’s failure to disclose in the EIS
another agency’s concerns with the proposed wharf.14
Part II describes the underlying facts of Ground Zero II.15  Part
III provides a comprehensive discussion of the EIS requirements
and the relevant legal background surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s
rulings in the instant case.16  Part IV describes the court’s rulings
regarding the Navy’s failure to disclose appendix information and
the Safety Board’s conditional approval of the wharf’s proposed lo-
cation.17  Part V examines the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and its rela-
tionship to relevant precedent and legal standards.18  Finally, Part
VI discusses the potential impact of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings on
future cases involving alleged NEPA violations for failing to disclose
particular information in an EIS.19
II. FACTS
In the 1990s, in order to meet the increasingly frequent main-
tenance requirements of upgraded and aging ballistic missiles held
at Naval Base Kitsap, the Navy began the proposal process for the
construction of a second EHW (EHW-2).20  As mandated by NEPA,
the Navy prepared an EIS.21  The EIS evaluated the potential nega-
tive impacts of EHW-2’s construction on the surrounding environ-
ment, the absence of feasible possible alternative sites for the wharf,
and the Navy’s efforts to comply with relevant agencies’ safety regu-
lations.22  The EIS also included multiple appendices, three of
14. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s rulings relevant to this
Note, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
15. For a summary of the factual background of Ground Zero II, see infra notes
20-50 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the instant case’s legal background, see infra notes 51-
122 and accompanying text.
17. For a narrative analysis of the court’s decision, see infra notes 123-148 and
accompanying text.
18. For a critical analysis of the court’s opinion, see infra notes 149-183 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the legal impact of Ground Zero II, see infra notes 184-
197 and accompanying text.
20. See Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 860
F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting Navy’s determination one EHW was insuf-
ficient to meet maintenance requirements of aging missiles).  According to the
Navy, missile maintenance would require “400 ‘operational days’ . . . worth of
maintenance sessions in a year,” while the current EHW is only capable of 300
operational days per year. Id.
21. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.) (describing Navy’s preparation of
EIS to discuss potential environmental impacts of wharf construction project). For
a further discussion of the Environmental Impact Statement requirement, see infra
notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
22. See id. at 1248-49 (describing issues discussed in EIS).
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which (Appendices A, B, and C) were completely redacted after be-
ing deemed “unfit for public dissemination” because they included
information designated as “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Infor-
mation ‘(UCNI).’”23  After completing the other NEPA procedural
requirements, the Navy determined it would commence with plans
to construct EHW-2 adjacent to the original EHW.24
Following the Navy’s release of the final EIS, Ground Zero
Center for Non-Violent Action, along with other advocacy groups
and activists (collectively referred to as “Ground Zero”), brought
suit against the Navy and other officials for failing to meet NEPA’s
disclosure requirements.25  During the litigation process, the Navy
released documents revealing information not included in the
Navy’s final EIS.26  Some documents demonstrated that the Defen-
sive Explosives Safety Board (Safety Board), an agency tasked with
ensuring no harm results to “life and property” in areas surround-
ing ammunition storage facilities, only issued “conditional site ap-
proval” for EHW-2.27  The Safety Board issued conditional approval
because it was concerned about the potential risk of an “explosive
mishap” on one wharf triggering a series of explosions between the
two wharfs.28  The documents also showed that the Navy eventually
sought and acquired site approval from the Secretary of the Navy,
23. See id. at 1249 (discussing existence of appendices and reasons for re-
dacting contents).  The court described the appendices as follows:
Appendix A contained supplemental information describing the purpose
and need for the project, Appendix B contained additional information
regarding alternatives to EHW-2 that the Navy had considered, and Ap-
pendix C contained information regarding the distance “within which ac-
tivities and facilities are restricted to assure protection to life and
property in the event of an accident” . . . .
Id.  For a further discussion of UCNI, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
24. See id. (describing Navy’s announcement of its decision to move forward
with EHW-2’s construction after receiving public feedback and issuing final EIS).
25. See Ground Zero, 860 F.3d at 1249 (noting parties to suit against Navy and
plaintiffs’ primary cause of action).  Ground Zero sought a court order enjoining
the Navy from continuing its development of EHW-2. Id.
26. See id. (highlighting information not disclosed by Navy in EIS).  The previ-
ously undisclosed information was discovered in documents submitted to the dis-
trict court and garnered by Ground Zero through FOIA requests. Id. at 1249 n.2.
27. See id. at 1249-50 (describing revelation that Safety Board failed to issue
full approval of EHW’s construction); 10 U.S.C. § 172 (2011) (establishing Safety
Board and describing purposes of board).
28. See Ground Zero, 860 F.3d at 1250 (discussing Safety Board’s concern with
proposed distance between two wharfs that could increase risk of multiple explo-
sions).  The Safety Board determined it would have approved the site if the Navy
commissioned a study proving the likelihood of multiple explosions was minimal.
Id.  The Navy directed the Board’s attention to past safety studies concerning two
EHWs at a similar base in Georgia, but the Board “was not satisfied with the Navy’s
reliance on those studies.” Id.
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who is authorized to “approve construction despite any Safety
Board concerns.”29
During the litigation process, the Navy submitted less redacted
versions of the final EIS’s appendices that contained information
regarding the Navy’s safety evaluation of EHW-2.30  While the ap-
pendices were originally redacted in full, “the Navy had ‘conducted
additional review during the preparation of the Core Administra-
tive Record and . . . determined that portions of these documents
should not be designated as UCNI’” and were therefore suitable for
public release.31  In response to these submissions, Ground Zero
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the Navy violated
NEPA because the information regarding the safety risks of EHW-2,
the Safety Board’s conditional approval, and the previously re-
dacted information from the appendices, should have been dis-
closed in the final EIS.32  Ground Zero also alleged that the Navy
failed to conduct “a reasonably thorough analysis” of EHW-2’s po-
tential environmental impacts.33  The Navy denied these allegations
and filed its own summary judgment motion.34  The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy, denied Ground
Zero’s summary judgment motion, and denied Ground Zero’s re-
quest for an injunction.35
During the litigation process, the Navy’s attorney informed the
district court that the Navy inadvertently released documents “con-
taining Classified Information and/or Unclassified Controlled Nu-
clear Information.”36  The district court issued an order (Order)
sealing the inadvertently released documents and restricting their
public dissemination.37  In response, Ground Zero filed a motion to
reverse the court’s Order, arguing that some of the information
29. See id. (describing Navy’s ability to circumvent Safety Board and gain site
approval through “secretarial certification”).
30. See id. (discussing Navy’s submission of less redacted versions of Appendi-
ces A, B, and C to court).  The court noted that “Appendix A was released in its
entirety; Appendix B was released in a partially redacted form; but Appendix C
remained entirely redacted except for a textual description of its contents.” Id.
31. See id. (describing Navy’s reasons for entering less redacted versions of
appendices into administrative record).
32. See id. (listing Ground Zero’s arguments in support of its request for
injunction).
33. See Ground Zero, 860 F.3d at 1250 (describing additional claim made by
Ground Zero against Navy).
34. See id. (noting Navy filed for summary judgment on NEPA claims).
35. See id. (listing district court’s rulings on motions filed by opposing
parties).
36. See id. at 1250-51 (describing issue that arose during litigation regarding
mistaken disclosure of sensitive nuclear information).
37. See id. at 1250-51 (describing district court’s order).
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had already been disseminated to the public and the media, and
the Order constituted a violation of Ground Zero’s First Amend-
ment and due process rights.38  The district court rejected Ground
Zero’s arguments and denied the motion.39
Ground Zero filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, challenging the district court’s rulings on both the EIS
and the Order.40  First, Ground Zero argued the Navy violated
NEPA by failing to disclose the information made available during
litigation in Appendices A, B, and C in the original EIS.41  Second,
Ground Zero claimed the Navy committed another violation when
it failed to disclose the Safety Board’s conditional approval of EHW-
2.42  Ground Zero further contended the Navy conducted an “insuf-
ficiently thorough” analysis of potential alternative locations for
EHW-2 in their EIS.43  Finally, Ground Zero argued the Order vio-
lated due process on the basis of vagueness and the First Amend-
ment because it constituted a “prior restraint on speech.”44
After considering these claims individually, the Ninth Circuit
made a series of rulings.45  First, the court held that the Navy vio-
lated NEPA when it failed to disclose the information from the ap-
pendices made public during litigation in their original EIS.46
However, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Navy’s failure to disclose
The Order sealed portions of the record and directed that . . . no party
was to discuss or reference any of the documents identified by the order
“in any hearing in this matter[;]”[ ] no party was to “further dissemi-
nate[ ]” any of the documents; and . . . the parties were to return all the
CDs in their possession containing the record, as well as their copies of
the identified documents.
Id.
38. See Ground Zero, 860 F.3d at 1257-58 (outlining Ground Zero’s arguments
in support of motion to unseal records and lift district court’s restrictions).
Ground Zero contended that the district court’s order violated due process be-
cause it was “unconstitutionally vague” and failed to consider whether the organi-
zation could disseminate the sealed information in the future if it was obtained by
independent sources. Id.  Ground Zero also argued the Order violated the First
Amendment because it constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 1258.
39. Id. at 1251 (describing district court’s ruling on Ground Zero’s motion).
40. Id. at 1250-51 (noting Ground Zero’s challenge of district court’s rulings).
41. Id. at 1250 (describing Ground Zero’s argument with respect to previously
unreleased appendices from EIS).
42. Ground Zero, 860 F.3d at 1251 (listing appellants’ arguments with respect
to Navy’s EIS).
43. Id. (describing Ground Zero’s challenge to thoroughness of alternatives
analysis).
44. Id. at 1268 (describing Ground Zero’s First Amendment challenge to dis-
trict court’s order).
45. Id. at 1263 (listing Court’s rulings on Ground Zero’s claims against Navy).
46. Id. at 1252 (holding Navy’s failure to disclose information from appendi-
ces in original EIS constituted NEPA violation).
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss2/8
2018] NO HARM, NO FOUL 375
this information was harmless.47  The Ninth Circuit also agreed
with Ground Zero’s argument that the Navy violated NEPA by fail-
ing to disclose the Safety Board’s conditional approval of the wharf
construction site but, again, concluded this error was harmless.48
Next, the Court rejected Ground Zero’s contention that the Navy
failed to conduct a thorough analysis of alternative sites for EWH-
2.49  Finally, the court directed that Ground Zero’s First Amend-
ment claim be addressed on remand under “a stricter standard” to
determine whether the district court properly restricted further dis-
semination of documents inadvertently released by the Navy during
litigation.50
III. BACKGROUND
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is considered
fundamental legislation for environmental protection policy in the
United States.51  Congress passed NEPA to prevent harm to the en-
vironment, promote human health through environmental protec-
tion, and provide widespread education about vital national
resources.52  To effectuate these goals, NEPA compels federal agen-
cies to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of “major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”53  NEPA expressly dictates that federal agencies
must comply with the Act’s requirements “to the fullest extent pos-
47. Ground Zero, 860 F.3d at 1252 (describing Navy’s failure to disclose rele-
vant information from appendices as “harmless error”).
48. Id. at 1256 (explaining Navy’s failure to disclose Safety Board’s condi-
tional approval “was inconsistent with . . . responsibility NEPA imposed,” but was
ultimately harmless).
49. Id. at 1257 (describing Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that analysis of alterna-
tive sites was reasonable).
50. Id. at 1260 (describing court’s holding on First Amendment issue).  The
Ninth Circuit announced that on remand, the lower court was required to “iden-
tify ‘a compelling reason [to impose the restriction] and articulate the factual basis
for its ruling’” to determine whether further restrictions on the documents could
be imposed. Id. at 1261 (quoting Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172,
1179 (9th Cir. 2006)).
51. See Gilda M. Tuoni, NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act: A Prospect for
Disclosure, 4 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (1975) (citing 115 CONG. REC.
19008 (1969)) (describing how NEPA was first act of Congress that regulated
“management of . . . country’s present and future environment”).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (listing goals of NEPA).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) (describing scope of NEPA’s require-
ments).  NEPA does not set out a standard for what constitutes a major federal
action, but the statute explicitly establishes its applicability to “proposed” actions.
Id.
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sible.”54  NEPA does not require agencies to achieve the law’s sub-
stantive environmental protection goals; rather, NEPA operates by
mandating federal agencies to consider the potential effects of their
actions on the environment.55
A. NEPA and Environmental Impact Statements
To encourage agency compliance, NEPA includes “action forc-
ing” provisions that require agencies to not only fully consider the
potential environmental impacts of their projects, but to “provide
for broad dissemination of relevant environmental information.”56
To this end, NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare environ-
mental impact statements in conjunction with proposals made for
major federal actions.57  NEPA compels an agency proposing a ma-
jor federal action to provide information in its EIS pertaining to
five specific categories.58  Those details include:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii)
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alter-
natives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship be-
tween local short-term uses of man’s environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
54. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (describing Congress’ intent to have agencies
fully comply with NEPA); see also Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of
Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976) (explaining NEPA’s command that agencies fully
comply with Act’s requirements was “neither accidental nor hyperbolic”).
55. See Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (discussing
how NEPA operates by requiring consideration of environmental effects of federal
actions, as opposed to mandating substantive results).
56. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)) (describing methods
established by NEPA to achieve “sweeping policy goals”).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) (describing NEPA’s environmental impact
statement mandate).  To determine whether an EIS is mandated, an agency must
look to the regulations set forth by the Counsel on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
which was established under NEPA. See DOT v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757
(2004) (explaining how CEQ, established under NEPA, “has promulgated regula-
tions to guide federal agencies in determining what actions are subject to that
statutory requirement.”).  The CEQ regulations allow agencies to prepare a limited
version of an EIS, known as an Environmental Assessment (EA), when it is not
necessarily apparent whether an EIS is required under NEPA. Id.  If the EA reveals
that an EIS is not required for a particular action, the agency that prepared the EA
“must issue a finding of no significant impact (FONSI),” which articulates why the
proposed action would not have any substantial impact on the surrounding envi-
ronment. Id. at 757-58 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) (listing required components of EIS).
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resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.59
Significantly, NEPA also directs federal agencies proposing a
major federal action to coordinate with “any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any envi-
ronmental impact involved.”60  This requirement, known as the
agency consultation mandate, must take place prior to preparing
the final EIS, as it serves as “the preliminary draft statement on
which comments from other agencies are to be sought.”61  The
mandate furthers NEPA’s central goals by compelling an agency to
consider information provided by other agencies that have the req-
uisite experience to identify environmental risks or issues specific to
a proposed federal action.62
B. NEPA and Public Disclosure
The statutory language of NEPA does not establish a “formal
role for the public” in evaluating the potential environmental im-
pacts of proposed major federal actions.63  NEPA does direct, how-
ever, that copies of an EIS be submitted to the President and the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and be made available
to the public for review.64  Additionally, CEQ regulations instruct
agencies to create procedures that promote public involvement in
evaluating environmental impact statements.65  Moreover, NEPA
59. Id. (illustrating required components of EIS).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1970) (describing agency consultation
mandate).
After preparing a draft environmental impact statement and before pre-
paring a final environmental impact statement the agency shall . . .
[o]btain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved or which is authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards.
40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(1).
61. FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW VOL. 4 § 9.03(3)(c), at
9-180 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1998) (discussing procedural requirements of
agency consultation requirement).
62. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1021 (9th
Cir. 1980) (stating purpose of requiring agencies to acquire commentary from
other agencies on potential environmental risks of proposed federal action).
63. See GRAD, supra note 61, at 9-184 (discussing relationship between public
and goals of NEPA).
64. See id. § 9.01 (“Copies of [an EIS] . . . shall be made available to the Presi-
dent, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the public”).
65. See id. (describing federal regulations promoting public involvement in
carrying out NEPA’s goals); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a)-(b) (requiring agencies
“make diligent efforts” to promote public involvement).
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explicitly directs that the public disclosure of information con-
tained in an EIS be governed by the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).66  Although Congress enacted FOIA to promote trans-
parency and access to government materials, in the context of
NEPA, an agency can withhold information from an EIS if the ma-
terial satisfies one of the exemptions under FOIA.67
In particular, when an agency proposes a major federal action
that intersects with national security issues, such as those relating to
nuclear weapons, the agency may prevent the dissemination of in-
formation contained in the EIS on the basis of FOIA’s “National
Security Exemption.”68  The Secretary of Defense is also authorized
to place restrictions on public dissemination of agency material if it
“could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect
on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and
security by significantly increasing the likelihood of illegal produc-
tion of nuclear weapons, or theft, diversion, or sabotage of special
nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities.”69  The Department of
Defense has statutory authority to disallow public review of informa-
tion that is not restricted under the previous standard, but may not
66. See GRAD, supra note 61, at 9-184 (noting public dissemination of EIS is
governed by 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966)); see also Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (providing “NEPA’s public
disclosure requirements are expressly governed by FOIA”).
67. See Tuoni, supra note 51, at 180 (explaining FOIA “exempts from its scope
nine areas of sensitive concern”).  The nine FOIA exemptions are as follows:
Exemption 1: Information that is classified to protect national security[;]
Exemption 2: Information related solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of an agency[;] Exemption 3: Information that is prohib-
ited from disclosure by another federal law[;] Exemption 4: Trade secrets
or commercial or financial information that is confidential or privi-
leged[;] Exemption 5: Privileged communications within or between
agencies[;] Exemption 6: Information that, if disclosed, would invade an-
other individual’s personal privacy[;] Exemption 7: Information com-
piled for law enforcement purposes that [meets one of seven
standards][;] Exemption 8: Information that concerns the supervision of
financial institutions[;] Exemption 9: Geological information on wells.
The United States Department of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.GOV,
https://www.foia.gov/faq.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
68. See Amy J. Sauber, The Application of NEPA to Nuclear Weapons Production,
Storage, and Testing: Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 11
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 805, 815 (1984)  (explaining agencies’ reliance on Na-
tional Security Exemption, which places “disclosure restrictions on information
which the President has determined must be kept secret to protect the national
defense or to advance foreign policy”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1966) (man-
dating certain information is subject to restriction from disclosure if it is “(A) spe-
cifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive Order”).
69. 10 U.S.C. § 128(a)(1)-(2) (2016) (establishing standard for withholding
unclassified, but potentially sensitive, material from response to FOIA request).
10
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be appropriate for public dissemination, by designating the infor-
mation as Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI).70
The Department of Defense may designate information as UCNI
and protect it from disclosure when it meets the “adverse effects
test,” meaning “the unauthorized dissemination of such informa-
tion could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the
health and safety of the public or the common defense and security
by increasing significantly the likelihood of the illegal production
of nuclear weapons.”71
C. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has not established concrete standards re-
garding the specific kind of information that an agency must dis-
close to satisfy NEPA’s five informational requirements.72  The
Court has, however, considered whether an agency’s failure to dis-
close or include particular information in an EIS renders that EIS
insufficient under NEPA.73  In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Ha-
waii/Peace Education Project,74 the Supreme Court considered the is-
sue of whether the Navy was required to prepare a “Hypothetical
Environmental Impact Statement” (HEIS).75  A HEIS statement re-
quires the Navy to hypothesize about the impact of storing nuclear
weapons at a proposed facility without revealing the type, amount,
and purpose of the weapons to be stored there.76  The suit in Wein-
berger revolved around the Navy’s preparation of an Environmental
70. See 32 C.F.R. § 223.6(a)(1) (2012) (describing standards for identifying
UCNI and withholding it from public disclosure).
71. Id.  (describing standards for identifying UCNI and withholding it from
public disclosure).  To be protected, the information must meet the adverse effects
test, be unclassified, and “pertain to security measures, including plans, proce-
dures, and equipment, for the physical protection of DoD SNM, SNM equipment,
SNM facilities, or nuclear weapons in DoD custody.” Id. at § 223.6(b)(i)-(iii).
“DoD” refers to the Department of Defense.  32 C.F.R. § 223.3 (2012).  “SNM”
refers to “special nuclear material,” which is defined as “(1) plutonium, uranium
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which
the Commission . . . determines to be special nuclear material, but does not in-
clude source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the forego-
ing, but does not include source material.”  42 U.S.C. § 2014 (2005)
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)(i)-(v) (1970) (listing categories of informa-
tion that must be included in EIS).  For a further discussion of Supreme Court
decisions on requirements of EIS, see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
73. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s commentary on informa-
tion included in an EIS, see infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
74. 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
75. Id. at 140-41 (describing issue of “Hypothetical Environmental Impact
Statement” considered by Supreme Court).
76. Id. at 143-44 (describing court of appeals’ decision challenged on appeal).
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Assessment (EA) for a proposed ammunition storage facility.77  Af-
ter completing the EA, the Navy determined that no significant im-
pact on the environment would result from the construction of the
ammunition storage facility, and declined to prepare an EIS.78  The
Navy’s FONSI decision prompted advocacy groups to bring suit
against the Navy for violating NEPA, arguing that the site’s poten-
tial nuclear storage capabilities required the Navy to prepare an
EIS.79  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit attempted to balance national
security concerns with the public disclosure goals of NEPA and held
that the Navy was required to prepare a HEIS, addressing the site’s
potential nuclear capabilities while shielding the Navy from having
to acknowledge classified nuclear information.80
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision
and held that preparation of a HEIS was not required.81  Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the court of appeals’ decision contra-
dicted “the express intent of Congress” to have FOIA govern the
public disclosure of information in an EIS.82  According to Justice
Rehnquist, NEPA’s language dictated that an agency must evaluate
the environmental impacts of its proposed actions, but NEPA does
not necessarily require an agency to disclose documents related to
that decision-making process.83  As Justice Rehnquist noted, given
that classified information included in the Navy’s consideration of
environmental impacts was exempted from disclosure under FOIA,
the Ninth Circuit’s mandate that the Navy prepare a HEIS dis-
rupted the balance between public disclosure and national security
concerns under FOIA.84
77. See id. at 141 (explaining Navy’s preparation of environmental assess-
ment).  For a further discussion of Environmental Assessments, see supra note 57
and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 141 (describing circumstances leading advocacy groups to file suit
against Navy).
79. See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 142 (discussing advocacy groups’ suit and allega-
tions against Navy).
80. Id. at 143-44 (describing Ninth Circuit’s holding).
81. Id. at 146 (describing Supreme Court’s holding).
82. Id. at 144 (discussing Congress’s intent for FOIA to balance public access
to government documents and government’s interest in secrecy).
83. See id. at 143 (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62
(1975)) (explaining Supreme Court’s prior conclusion that FOIA does not man-
date disclosure of certain information by agencies if those agencies are not com-
pelled by other law to do so).
84. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 145 (discussing “Congress has thus effected a bal-
ance between the needs of the public for access to documents prepared by a fed-
eral agency and the necessity of nondisclosure or secrecy. The Court of Appeals in
this case should have accepted the balance . . . rather than engrafting onto the
statutory language unique concepts of its own making.”).
12
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In Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,85 advocacy groups
challenged the Forest Service’s issuance of a special use permit to
Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI), which allowed the company to de-
velop a ski resort on a six thousand foot mountain in Okanogan
County, Washington, known as “Sandy Butte.”86  Upon receipt of
MRI’s permit application, the Forest Service and local officials col-
laborated to prepare an EIS, which included the potential effects of
resort development on the on-site and off-site environments and
“conceptual” steps that could be taken to mitigate negative environ-
mental impacts.87  The advocacy groups argued that the Forest Ser-
vice’s EIS was insufficient under NEPA because it failed to give
adequate consideration to the resort’s potential impact on air qual-
ity and the mule deer population.88
In reversing the court of appeals’ decision that the EIS was in-
adequate, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclu-
sion that particular action must be taken to mitigate negative
environmental impacts of proposed actions.89  According to the Su-
preme Court, the Ninth Circuit erred in imposing a subsequent
duty on agencies to include specific statements regarding mitiga-
tion methods.90  Justice Stevens acknowledged that, under the stat-
utes and regulations, agency discussion of possible steps for
alleviating negative effects of development on the surrounding en-
vironment is “one important ingredient” of an EIS.91  Without this
information, the Justice noted, the public would not be able to fully
“evaluate the severity of the adverse effects” of proposed major fed-
eral actions.92  Justice Stevens argued, however, that there was a
85. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
86. Id. at 337-38, 344 (describing action taken by MRI that was challenged by
advocacy groups).
87. Id. at 338-340 (outlining various components of EIS prepared for pro-
posed ski resort).
88. Id. at 345-46, 350 (noting advocacy groups’ central claim against Forest
Service’s decision to issue permit to MRI).
89. Id. at 346, 353 (describing Supreme Court’s decision to reverse court of
appeals).
90. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 353 (rejecting Ninth Circuit’s imposition of duty to
include particularized mitigation methods in EIS).  The Supreme Court also held
that 1) a “worst case analysis” assessing the impact of the project on the environ-
ment was not required and its absence did not make the Forest Service’s EIS “inad-
equate,” and 2) the Forest Service’s failure to include a “mitigation plan” in the
EIS did not violate its own regulations. Id. at 356, 358-59.
91. Id. at 351 (noting how language of NEPA and CEQ regulations establish
requirement that mitigation steps be sufficiently discussed in EIS); see also 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.25(b)(3) (requiring agencies to consider “mitigation measures” in EIS).
92. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352 (noting discussion of mitigation steps is neces-
sary to inform interested groups of potential environmental consequences of pro-
posed action).
13
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“fundamental distinction” between including a discussion of mitiga-
tion steps in an EIS to ensure potential negative impacts on the
environment were considered, and the actual formulation and im-
plementation of a concrete mitigation plan.93  Requiring the imple-
mentation of a substantive mitigation plan would, according to the
Supreme Court, be incongruous with NEPA’s primary “reliance on
procedural mechanisms.”94
D. Ninth Circuit Precedent
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged that the EIS
serves two primary purposes: to demonstrate that an agency has
fully considered the potential negative impacts of its proposed ac-
tion on the environment, and to provide the public with “relevant
information” about the proposal’s environmental effects.95  The
Ninth Circuit evaluates the sufficiency of an EIS by considering
whether a particular agency has taken a “hard look” at environmen-
tal impacts of proposed major federal actions.96  What constitutes
taking a “hard look” varies based on context, but can include the
following: disclosing and addressing conflicting scientific view-
points in a final EIS; conducting a “cumulative impact analysis” of
past, present, and future projects in the surrounding environment;
and discussing potential steps to mitigate environmental impacts.97
93. Id. (describing distinction between considering mitigation steps and de-
veloping substantive mitigation plan, which is not warranted under NEPA).
94. Id. at 353 (noting inconsistency with intent of statute that would arise
upon implementation of substantive mitigation plan).
95. See Sierra Club v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 840 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th
Cir. 2016) (citing Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n v. Vilsack, 816 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2016)) (describing EIS as “procedural requirement” with dual purpose ensur-
ing “careful consideration” of environmental impacts and public dissemination of
relevant information); see also Lands Council v. McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2010) (describing NEPA and its requirements as having dual purposes of en-
suring careful consideration of environmental impacts on federal projects and dis-
seminating related information to public).
96. See No GWEN All. of Lane Cty., Inc., v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“Our role in this case is not to consider the propriety of constructing
GWEN, but rather to [e]nsure that the Air Force in exercising its discretion to
develop GWEN has taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences flowing
from its substantive decision.”); see also Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisher-
ies Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[Appellant] claims, the Final Sup-
plemental Integrated Feasibility Report and Environmental Impact Statement fails
to take a ‘hard look’ at the channel deepening project’s various impacts.”).
97. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1167
(9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e hold that Appellees were required to disclose and respond
to [opposing] viewpoints in the final impact statement itself.”); see also Nw. Envtl.
Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]e agree with the district court that the Corps’ cumulative impact analysis
satisfied NEPA’s ‘hard look’ requirement.”); see also Great Basin Res. Watch v. Bu-
14
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If, in a particular case, it is determined that an agency has
failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental effects of a pro-
posed major federal action, the Ninth Circuit then considers
whether the error was harmless.98  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
determines “whether the error caused the agency not to be fully
aware of the environmental consequences of the proposed action,
thereby precluding informed decisionmaking [sic] and public par-
ticipation, or otherwise materially affected the substance of the
agency’s decision.”99  This standard is rooted in the Administrative
Procedure Act, which requires courts reviewing agency actions to
take into “due account . . . the rule of prejudicial error.”100
In a recent case, Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Jewel,101 the
Ninth Circuit provided some guidance as to the kind of NEPA viola-
tion that does not constitute a harmless error.102  In that case, the
court concluded that an EIS prepared for the development of a
wind-energy project in Oregon violated NEPA because it failed to
accurately address the project’s potential impact on the winter-for-
aging activities of a local bird species, the greater sage-grouse.103
reau of Land Mgmt., 844 F.3d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We hold that the BLM
complied with NEPA in discussing possible mitigation measures to address the ef-
fects that would flow from poor pit-lake water quality.”).  A “cumulative impact
analysis” evaluates “the impact on the environment which results from the incre-
mental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or
person undertakes such other actions.”  Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fish-
eries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7).  An
agency proposing a major federal action is required to conduct a cumulative im-
pact analysis in its EIS. See 40 C.F.R. §1508.25(c)(3).
98. See Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n v. Vilsack, 816 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir.
2016) (stating harmless error standard).
99. Id. (explaining standard used by Ninth Circuit courts to determine
whether harm resulted because of NEPA violation).
100. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)) (defining scope of review for courts
evaluating agency decisions).
101. 840 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 2016).
102. Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 840 F.3d at 570 (concluding NEPA violation at issue
was not harmless).
103. Id. at 569 (announcing court’s holding that EIS proposed wind-energy
project failed “to provide ‘[a]ccurate scientific analysis,’ which is ‘essential to im-
plementing NEPA.’”).  The proposed wind-energy project, which was to be devel-
oped on a privately-owned tract of land on Steens Mountain in Oregon, was
considered one of the few remaining habitats for sagebrush. Id. at 565.  Sagebrush,
a plant found mainly in the Midwestern and Western parts of the United States, is
vital to the greater sage-grouse’s survival, particularly in winter months. Id. at 565-
66; See Forest Jay Gauna, Plant of the Week: Sagebrush, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST
SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/plant-of-the-week/artemisia_tridentata
.shtml (last visited May 7, 2018).  The court explained that The United States Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM), which prepared the EIS for the project, ac-
knowledged that the project could pose a potential danger to the sagebrush
15
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The court noted that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
which prepared the EIS, based its erroneous conclusions about the
presence of the greater sage-grouse on the project site during win-
ter months on research conducted at nearby sites, as opposed to
the site actually chosen for the project.104  According to the Ninth
Circuit, this did not constitute harmless error because the lack of
sufficient information impeded the public’s ability to “tailor its
comments to address concerns regarding the potential winter pres-
ence of sage[-]grouse at the [project] site,” prevented the BLM
from sufficiently assessing the wind-energy project’s impact on the
greater sage-grouse, and inhibited the BLM from formulating ade-
quate mitigation measures.105
Prior to deciding the instant case, the Ninth Circuit decided
Ground Zero Center for Non-Violent Action v. United States Department of
the Navy (Ground Zero I),106 in which the court evaluated the Navy’s
failure to prepare NEPA documentation for a proposed action.107
In that case, Ground Zero challenged the Navy’s proposed program
to upgrade handling facilities at Naval Base Bangor (now known as
Naval Base Kitsap).108  This program, known as the “Backfit Pro-
gram,” was originally set to commence in 1989, but was stalled by
the termination of the Cold War until President Bill Clinton au-
thorized the program to move forward in 2000.109
In early 1999, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
identified two species of fish located at Naval Base Kitsap as
“threatened.”110  The Navy evaluated the potential impact of the
Backfit Program on the two fish species and determined the pro-
habitat, but did not conduct research on the project site to determine whether
sage grouse would actually be present on the site during the winter. Id. at 567.
104. Id. at 567 (explaining BLM based its conclusions about greater sage-
grouse on surveys conducted in East and West Ridge sites).
105. See id. at 570-71 (explaining error was not harmless because BLM’s inac-
curate analysis “materially impeded” public commentary and BLM’s decision-mak-
ing process).
106. 383 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).
107. Id. at 1084 (summarizing circumstances prompting Ground Zero’s com-
mencement of lawsuit).
108. Id. at 1084-85 (describing program challenged by Ground Zero).  In the
1970s, upon selecting the Bangor site, the Navy prepared an EIS to consider the
potential environmental impacts of the TRIDENT program on the community. Id.
at 1084.  After numerous supplements to the EIS, the Navy concluded an upgrade
to the TRIDENT II system could be accomplished at some “unspecified future
date.” Id.  After settling on an upgrade plan in the 1980s, the Navy issued a new
EIS for the Backfit Program in 1989. Id. at 1085.
109. Id. at 1085 (describing program challenged by Ground Zero).
110. Id. (discussing listing of threatened fish species located at naval base).
16
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gram would not have any adverse impact.111  The Navy shared its
conclusions with NMFS, but did not prepare any NEPA documenta-
tion.112  Ground Zero filed suit and alleged, in part, that the Navy
had violated NEPA for failing to prepare documentation analyzing
the potential environmental impacts of the Backfit Program.113
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy,
prompting Ground Zero to appeal on the basis that NEPA allegedly
required the Navy to prepare an EIS to analyze potential risks of
accidental explosions of the upgraded missiles on the base.114
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in favor
of the Navy.115  The court noted that CEQ regulations required
agencies to analyze “‘reasonably foreseeable’ environmental effects
of their proposed actions.”116  The court reaffirmed its longstand-
ing rejection of a rule requiring agencies to include and analyze in
an EIS every possible environmental impact.117  Instead, the court
found all that was required of agencies was to conduct a “reasonably
thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable envi-
ronmental consequences.”118  In applying these principles to the
facts, the court determined that it was unnecessary for the Navy to
prepare an additional EIS because it had previously conducted an
analysis of potential risks of accidental explosions on the base and
concluded that the risks were extremely small.119
111. Ground Zero I, 383 F.3d at 1085 (describing conclusions of Navy’s analysis
of Backfit Program’s potential effects on threatened fish species).
112. Id. (describing Navy’s actions following analysis of Backfit Program’s po-
tential effects on threatened fish species).
113. Id. (describing Ground Zero’s allegation against Navy).  Ground Zero
also contended the Navy was required to analyze potential impacts of terrorism,
earthquakes, and tsunamis on the base. Id. at 1085-86.  Additionally, Ground Zero
brought a challenge under the Endangered Species Act, but this claim is beyond
the scope of this Note. Id. at 1085.
114. Id. at 1086 (stating Ground Zero’s claim on appeal).  Ground Zero ar-
gued that NEPA required preparation of an EIS to evaluate potential effects of
explosions from both the upgraded missiles and missiles armed with nuclear war-
heads. Id.
115. Id. at 1092 (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Navy).
116. Ground Zero I, 383 F.3d at 1089 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.8(b))
(describing federal regulations that dictate types of environmental impacts to be
discussed in EIS).
117. Id. (quoting No GWEN All. of Lane Cty., Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380,
1385 (9th Cir. 1988)) (noting historical rejection of requirement that agencies
evaluate all possible environmental impacts in EIS).
118. Id. at 1089-90 (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283
(9th Cir. 1974)) (stating Ninth Circuit’s standard for sufficient analysis in EIS).
119. Id. at 1091 (concluding Navy was not required to prepare additional
NEPA documentation).
17
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The court also rejected Ground Zero’s argument that the Navy
was required to produce a new EIS based on its reliance on the
Department of Defense’s base planning standards throughout its
EIS.120  As the court noted, the Department of Defense must evalu-
ate risks to ensure “maximum possible protection” of people and
property on a base, a standard that is higher than NEPA’s “reasona-
bly foreseeable” risk standard described above.121  Consequently,
NEPA’s risk assessment standard did not rise to the level of those
set forth by the Department of Defense, and as the court con-
cluded, the Navy was not required to conduct further analysis be-
yond the risk assessment already performed.122
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In addressing the Navy’s alleged violations of NEPA in Ground
Zero II, the Ninth Circuit noted the Navy’s EIS and its appendices
would be evaluated under the “hard look” standard.123  To deter-
mine whether the Navy’s redacted disclosures satisfied this stan-
dard, the court considered each item of withheld information
individually, beginning with the Navy’s failure to include informa-
tion in the appendices of the final EIS that were later released
through litigation.124
To evaluate the sufficiency of the Navy’s disclosures, the court
relied on the express statutory language of NEPA, conclusions of
the Supreme Court in Weinberger, and various federal regulations.125
According to the court, NEPA required the Navy to demonstrate
that the information contained within the appendices could be
withheld from public disclosure as UCNI at the point “when the
Navy first refused to disclose any part of the appendices.”126  The
120. Id. at 1090 (finding Ground Zero’s argument erroneous).
121. Ground Zero I, 383 F.3d at 1090 (describing divergent risk analysis stan-
dards of Department of Defense and NEPA).
122. Id. at 1091 (concluding Navy successfully complied with NEPA’s
requirements).
123. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1251 (setting forth standard of review for in-
stant case).  For a further discussion of the “hard look” standard, see supra notes
96-97 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 1251-53 (addressing Ground Zero’s allegation that Navy violated
NEPA by failing to disclose “later-produced appendix information”).
125. Id. at 1252 (listing applicable law and precedent).  The Court’s reliance
on NEPA’s statutory language, the Supreme Court’s conclusions in Weinberger, and
various federal regulations was predicated on the Navy’s original claim, when the
final EIS and redacted appendices were first released, that the information was
subject to nondisclosure due to its status as UCNI. Id. at 1249.  For a further dis-
cussion of UCNI, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
126. Id. (describing circumstances under which Navy was required to demon-
strate exemption from disclosure).
18
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court agreed with Ground Zero’s argument that the Navy’s eventual
disclosure of the appendix information indicated that the Navy did
not meet the UCNI standard under FOIA when the Navy originally
released the entirely redacted appendices.127  Absent the UCNI ex-
emption under FOIA, the Navy was required to disclose the appen-
dix information to satisfy NEPA’s demand that disclosure be made
“to the fullest extent possible.”128  The court concluded the Navy’s
failure to disclose the information at the time of the EIS’s release
constituted a violation of NEPA.129
Despite finding that the Navy violated NEPA, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the Navy’s nondisclosure was harmless.130  The
court rejected Ground Zero’s argument that the Navy’s initial re-
daction of Appendix C impeded the public’s ability to judge the
comprehensiveness of the Navy’s safety evaluation regarding EHW-
2 and therefore reduced public “pressure for meaningful study.”131
The court noted that Appendix C’s label, “Explosives Safety Arcs
for Existing EHW and Proposed Second EHW,” would not have
misled readers to believe that this particular appendix included an
extensive safety evaluation.132  According to the court, the public’s
ability to comment on the proposed construction of EHW-2 was not
affected by the failure to disclose the information in Appendix C.133
The court went on to address Ground Zero’s claim that the
Navy violated NEPA by failing to disclose the Safety Board’s condi-
tional approval of the proposed location for EHW-2.134  The Navy
127. Id. (accepting Ground Zero’s argument that Navy’s disclosure of appen-
dix information during litigation is evidence that Navy could not meet nondisclo-
sure standard under FOIA).
128. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1252 (describing disclosure standard under
NEPA).
129. Id. (holding Navy’s failure to release non-redacted appendices at time of
final EIS’s original release constituted violation of NEPA).
130. Id. (concluding Navy’s failure to disclose information in appendices was
harmless).
131. Id. at 1252-53 (describing Ground Zero’s argument opposing claim of
Navy’s harmless error).  The court focused only on Appendix C, and Ground Zero
failed to indicate how the “revealed portions of Appendix A or B [ ] would have
made a difference in agency decisionmaking or public participation.” Id. at 1252.
132. Id. at 1253 (discussing relevance of Appendix C to public’s ability to par-
ticipate in evaluating environmental impact of proposed EHW-2).  Ground Zero
argued the release of an un-redacted version of Appendix C upon the final EIS’s
release would have alerted the public to the Navy’s insufficient explosives safety
evaluation. Id. at 1252-53.  The court concluded the plain language of Appendix
C’s heading made Ground Zero’s contention “unpersuasive.” Id. at 1253.
133. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1253 (determining Appendix C’s heading
would not alert reader to presence of “thorough analysis of safety risks”).
134. Id. at 1253-56 (discussing Ground Zero’s challenge to Navy’s failure to
disclose Safety Board’s disapproval).
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argued, based on the decision in Ground Zero I, that they were not
required to disclose the Safety Board’s concerns surrounding  the
Navy’s safety evaluation because the risks prompting the Safety
Board to issue conditional approval were “similarly remote” to the
risks discussed in Ground Zero I.135  The court distinguished Ground
Zero’s arguments against the Navy, noting the Navy’s failure to dis-
close the conditional site approval could constitute either: (1) a fail-
ure to satisfy the “hard look” standard, or (2) a failure to satisfy
NEPA’s agency consultation mandate.136
With regard to the first challenge, the court ultimately found
that the Navy’s risk assessment satisfied the “hard look” standard.137
Affording deference to the Navy’s decision-making, the court deter-
mined that the Navy took numerous steps to carefully analyze the
potential risks of EHW-2.138  The court reaffirmed the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s longstanding principle that an EIS is not required to discuss
“every conceivable environmental impact.”139  The court deter-
mined that the Navy’s failure to disclose the Safety Board’s con-
cerns did not violate NEPA’s “hard look” standard because the
risks, although relevant under the Safety Board’s more stringent
standard of review, were insignificant for NEPA purposes.140
The court, nonetheless, pointed to NEPA’s statutory language,
as well as Ninth Circuit precedent, and concluded that “the Navy’s
own adequate determination that the risk of explosion was low does
not excuse its failure to disclose . . . the results of its consultation
with the Safety Board.”141  The court noted that NEPA’s agency
consultation mandate “applies with special force to the Safety
135. Id. at 1253 (describing Navy’s view that it had no obligation to disclose
conditional approval because safety risks surrounding construction of EHW-2 were
small).
136. Id. at 1253-54 (distinguishing specific arguments made by Ground Zero
regarding Navy’s nondisclosure of conditional site approval).
137. Id. at 1255 (concluding Navy’s evaluation of safety risks associated with
EHW-2 satisfied “hard look” standard).
138. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1254 (describing steps taken by Navy to evalu-
ate potential safety hazards of EHW-2).  The steps taken by the Navy included an
analysis of fatality risks, an evaluation of the risks associated with the distance be-
tween explosives handling sites in Georgia, consultations with the Safety Board and
internal and external representatives, written documentation on safety risks from
Navy Command, and accommodations with various explosives handling require-
ments set forth by the Safety Board. Id.
139. Id. (citing Ground Zero Ctr. For Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of
Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2004)) (discussing Ninth Circuit’s rejection of
idea that EIS should include all potential environmental impacts).
140. Id. at 1255 (noting failure to disclose Safety Board disapproval “[did] not
necessarily demonstrate substantive noncompliance with NEPA”).
141. Id. (discussing sources of law that required Navy to disclose Safety
Board’s disapproval).
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Board” because the Safety Board was created under federal law for
the explicit purpose of preventing harm from military opera-
tions.142  The Navy utilized Safety Board requirements in preparing
its EIS, and therefore implied that it would comply with those re-
quirements in the construction of EHW-2.143  According to the
court, the Navy’s “affirmative reliance” on the Safety Board’s stan-
dards, coupled with its nondisclosure of the conditional site ap-
proval, hindered NEPA’s public participation goals.144
The Ninth Circuit ruled, however, that the NEPA violation
based on the agency consultation mandate also constituted a harm-
less error.145  In coming to its conclusion, the court emphasized the
legislative intent of NEPA, specifically, having agencies provide op-
posing viewpoints regarding environmental impacts of major fed-
eral actions to foster “informed decisionmaking [sic] and public
participation.”146  The court determined that the Navy fully consid-
ered opposing viewpoints during its preparation of the EIS and,
given the low safety risks associated with EHW-2, was not required
to discuss the Safety Board’s concerns with the project.147  Accord-
ing to the court, public participation was not impeded by the non-
disclosure because the information would not have improved
public knowledge of the proposed wharf.148
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In finding the Navy violated NEPA by failing to disclose appen-
dix information and information regarding the Safety Board’s con-
ditional approval of EHW-2’s proposed locations, the Ninth Circuit
reinforced its commitment to its established interpretation of rele-
142. Id. (discussing Navy’s obligation to disclose consultation with Safety
Board based on reasons for Safety Board’s existence).
143. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1256 (noting Navy’s reliance on Safety Board’s
standards in decision-making “created the appearance” that Navy intended to meet
those standards).
144. Id. (summarizing actions taken by Navy that failed to satisfy NEPA).
145. Id.  (holding Navy’s NEPA violation for failing to disclose Safety Board’s
conditional approval was harmless).
146. Id. (quoting Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n v. Vilsack, 816 F.3d 1095, 1102-
04) (describing congressional intent of NEPA).
147. Id. (reiterating principle that NEPA does not require discussion of every
possible environmental impact in EIS).
148. Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1266 (determining public participation goals
were not impeded because information regarding Safety Board’s concerns was not
of sufficient concern to render its disclosure necessary).
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vant legal standards and regulations.149  The Ninth Circuit’s deter-
minations that the nondisclosure of both the appendix information
and the Safety Board’s disapproval were harmless errors, however,
paradoxically undermine a central purpose of NEPA’s creation:
that the public be involved in evaluating the risks of proposed fed-
eral actions to the environment.150
A. Nondisclosure of Information from Appendices
The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Navy violated NEPA
by failing to disclose the information contained in the appendices
of its final EIS, which was later released during litigation.151  As the
court asserted, although NEPA requires that information be dis-
closed “to the fullest extent possible,” the nondisclosure would have
been justified if the Navy had satisfied the UCNI standard at the
time when it first withheld the information from public review.152
This point is supported by the Weinberger decision, in which the
Supreme Court unequivocally affirmed the principle that Con-
gress’s express intent in drafting NEPA was to have public disclo-
sure under the Act be governed by FOIA and its progeny.153  Given
that the Navy later released the previously-redacted information
from the appendices on its own determination, the court properly
considered this willing disclosure to be an indication of the Navy’s
inability to meet the UCNI standard.154  The court further con-
cluded that the information should have been disclosed in order to
comply with NEPA.155
While the Ninth Circuit consistently determined that the non-
disclosure conflicted with NEPA’s requirements, its finding that the
149. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s findings that the Navy
violated NEPA for failing to disclose appendix information and the Safety Board’s
disapproval of the wharf site, see infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
150. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions that the non-
disclosures constituted harmless errors, see supra notes 130-133, 145-148 and ac-
companying text.
151. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1253 (concluding Navy violated NEPA for
failing to disclose information from appendices in release of final EIS).
152. See id. at 1252 (stating NEPA’s requirement that disclosure be made to
“fullest extent possible” and noting Navy could have had sufficient justification to
withhold appendix information if it had satisfied standard at point it first at-
tempted to withhold information from public dissemination).
153. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Weinberger,
see supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
154. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of the
Navy’s failure to meet the UCNI standard, see supra notes 125-129 and accompany-
ing text.
155. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1252 (noting Navy did not argue on appeal
that information from appendices met UCNI standard).
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nondisclosure constituted harmless error appears to overlook as-
pects of its own precedent.156  The court rejected Ground Zero’s
argument that the nondisclosure of information from Appendix C
impeded public involvement in evaluating the Navy’s analysis of en-
vironmental risks.157  In doing so, the court noted that Appendix
C’s label, “Explosives Safety Arcs for Existing EHW and Proposed
Second EHW,” made it unlikely that the public would have consid-
ered its information important to understanding the Navy’s risk
analysis.158  Significantly, as the majority explained in its summary
of the case, “Appendix C contained information regarding the dis-
tance ‘within which activities and facilities are restricted to assure
protection to life and property in the event of an accident.’”159
This was likely crucial information to the Navy’s decision-making
process, and as Ground Zero argued, “important to the public’s un-
derstanding” and consideration of the Navy’s safety analysis of
EHW-2.160  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Oregon Natural Desert As-
sociation concluded that a government’s failure to apprise the pub-
lic of information that would allow for informed consideration and
commentary does not constitute a harmless error.161  Given that the
Navy in Ground Zero II did just that by failing to disclose information
that would inform the public of the potential risks EHW-2 could
have posed to the surrounding environment, the court’s finding of
harmless error appears difficult to justify.162
B. Nondisclosure of Safety Board’s Conditional Approval
The court properly found that a NEPA violation occurred on
Ground Zero’s second claim, namely, that the Navy failed to pro-
mote NEPA’s public participation goals by not disclosing the Safety
156. Id. (holding Navy’s NEPA violation for failing to disclose information
from appendices constituted harmless error).
157. Id. at 1253 (finding Ground Zero’s argument that Navy’s failure to re-
lease information in Appendix C impeded public evaluation of Navy’s risk analysis
to be “unpersuasive”).
158. Id. (explaining reasoning behind its conclusion that Ground Zero’s ar-
gument regarding importance of Appendix C to public commentary was
erroneous).
159. Id. at 1249 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, TRIDENT SUPPORT FACILITIES
EXPLOSIVES HANDLING WHARF (EHW-2) FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(2012)) (describing content of Appendix C).
160. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1253 (describing Ground Zero’s argument
regarding Navy’s failure to release information from Appendix C).
161. For a further discussion of Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, see supra notes
101-105 and accompanying text.
162. For a further discussion of Ninth Circuit precedent regarding harmless
error in NEPA cases, see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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Board’s conditional approval of EHW-2’s proposed location.163  In
rejecting Ground Zero’s first argument that the nondisclosure vio-
lated the “hard look” standard, the court concluded that Ground
Zero I supported the Navy’s failure to disclose the Safety Board’s
disapproval because, in both cases, the Navy conducted safety risk
analyses of potential explosions and determined the risks were in-
significant.164  Because the Ninth Circuit in Ground Zero I concluded
that the Navy was not required to prepare a new EIS to discuss
those insignificant risks, it logically follows that, under the hard
look standard, the Navy was also not required to discuss the Safety
Board’s concerns regarding potential explosions in the EIS for
EHW-2.165
The Ninth Circuit, however, correctly determined that the fail-
ure to include the Safety Board’s disapproval in the EIS was a viola-
tion of NEPA’s agency consultation mandate.166  As the court
noted, NEPA requires an agency proposing a major federal action
to coordinate with “any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law
or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved.”167  The court explained that consultation with the Safety
Board was particularly relevant in this matter, as the Safety Board
was designed to ensure public safety and prevent harm to property
that could result from military activities.168  The Safety Board’s con-
clusions about the project were therefore especially relevant to the
Navy’s decision-making process.169  Because NEPA’s statutory lan-
guage explicitly identifies public involvement and informed deci-
sion-making goals, the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the Safety
Board’s concerns should have been included in the EIS for public
163. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1253-54 (describing Ground Zero’s claims
regarding failure to disclose Safety Board’s conditional approval).
164. Id. at 1254-55 (comparing facts of Ground Zero I and instant case).
165. See id. at 1255 (quoting Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Navy, 383 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2004)) (noting court in Ground Zero I
“rejected the notion that every conceivable environmental impact must be dis-
cussed in an EIS”).
166. Id. at 1256 (finding Navy’s failure to disclose Safety Board’s disapproval
constituted abdication of responsibility imposed on it by NEPA).
167. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)) (describ-
ing agency consultation mandate).  For a further discussion of the agency consulta-
tion mandate, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
168. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Department of Defense,
Directive 6055.9E at 2 (Aug. 19, 2005)) (describing applicability of agency consulta-
tion mandate to Safety Board in this case).
169. See id. at 1255-56 (explaining how Safety Board’s “special expertise” war-
ranted inclusion of its comments in Navy’s EIS).
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review was appropriate.170  In reaching this conclusion, the court
also noted the Navy’s frequent reliance on the Safety Board stan-
dards in planning the EHW-2’s construction.171  The court rea-
soned that such reliance, coupled with the failure to disclose the
Safety Board’s disapproval, violated the agency consultation man-
date and public commentary goals of NEPA.172
The Ninth Circuit, in reviewing the Navy’s decision not to in-
clude the Safety Board’s disapproval of EHW-2’s proposed location
in the EIS, again improperly concluded this error was harmless.173
In determining that the Navy was not required to disclose the Safety
Board’s concerns in the EIS, the court simply relied on the fact that
the Navy considered opposing viewpoints during the EIS’s prepara-
tion, even though those viewpoints were not disclosed, and on the
low safety risks presented by the wharf.174
The Ninth Circuit’s holding once again represents an apparent
divergence from past precedent.175  As the court noted in Ground
Zero II, it is true that an agency is not required to discuss every possi-
ble risk that is associated with a proposed project in an EIS.176  The
court, however, pointed to specific instances where the Navy relied
on the Safety Board’s explosives safety standards throughout the
EIS.177  For example, the court pointed to a portion of the EIS
where the Navy rejected an alternative site for the wharf because “it
would not comply with the Safety Board’s guidelines surrounding
the proper handling of explosives.”178  By doing so, the Navy implic-
itly acknowledged that the Safety Board’s standards and concerns
about the project were crucial to its decision-making process re-
garding EHW-2.179  Consequently, the Navy was obligated to in-
clude the Safety Board’s concerns regarding EHW-2 because of
170. For a further discussion of public participation goals of NEPA, see supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
171. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1256 (describing Navy’s “affirmative reli-
ance” on Safety Board standards in decision-making process).
172. Id. at 1255-56 (describing how Navy’s actions were “inconsistent” with
NEPA’s requirements regarding agency consultation and disclosure).
173. Id. (holding failure to disclose Safety Board consultation was harmless).
174. Id. at 1256 (summarizing reasons for finding harmless error).
175. For a further discussion of Ninth Circuit precedent regarding harmless
error and NEPA violations, see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
176. See Ground Zero II, 860 F.3d at 1255 (noting Ninth Circuit’s longstanding
principle that agencies are not required to discuss insignificant risks in EIS).
177. Id. at 1256 (referring to Navy’s compliance with Safety Board standards
throughout EIS).
178. Id. (describing specific instance in which Navy relied on Safety Board’s
standards in EIS).
179. Id. (discussing Ground Zero’s contention that Navy misrepresented itself
as complying with Safety Board’s standards).
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NEPA’s direction that disclosures are made to the fullest extent pos-
sible.180  Moreover, the Navy’s failure to include its consultation
with the Safety Board impeded the public’s ability to evaluate po-
tential safety risks that the Navy considered in its decision-making
process.181  This is precisely the kind of error the Ninth Circuit pre-
viously deemed to be harmful in Oregon Natural Desert Association,
where the court concluded the BLM’s failure to include sufficient
information regarding a wind-energy project’s risks to a local bird
species interfered with “informed decisionmaking [sic] and public
participation.”182  The Ninth Circuit’s failure to find the Navy’s
nondisclosure harmless in Ground Zero II is therefore contradictory
with its precedent.183
VI. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit’s rulings with respect to the Navy’s nondis-
closure of appendix information and the Safety Board’s concerns
constitute a paradox.184  On the one hand, the court upheld and
consistently adhered to relevant standards under NEPA and associ-
ated regulations in finding that the Navy’s nondisclosures violated
NEPA.185  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit contravened its
own precedent by concluding the NEPA violations constituted
harmless errors, when a previous error of similar significance was
deemed to be not harmless.186  The effects of the court’s holding
are two-fold: first, this decision has the potential to result in incon-
sistent application of the harmless error standard in future cases;
second, the Ninth Circuit’s holding potentially weakens the EIS as
an “action forcing” provision of NEPA.187
180. For a further discussion of NEPA’s compliance standard, see supra note
54 and accompanying text.
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (describing Congress’ intent to have agen-
cies fully comply with NEPA).
182. Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir. 2016) (ex-
plaining that BLM’s inadequate EIS interfered with public’s ability to comment on
environmental risks associated with wind-energy project).
183. For a further discussion of Ninth Circuit precedent regarding harmless
error and NEPA violations, see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
184. For an examination of the ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
see infra notes 185-197 and accompanying text.
185. For an analysis of the court’s justification for finding the Navy in viola-
tion of NEPA, see supra notes 149-183 and accompanying text.
186. For an analysis of the court’s reasoning, see supra notes 149-183 and ac-
companying text.
187. For an analysis of the effect of the court’s holding on the “harmless er-
ror” standard and the EIS as a procedural instrument, see infra notes 193-197 and
accompanying text.
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In its opinion, the court noted that the information not dis-
closed by the Navy in its EIS would not have furthered the public’s
knowledge regarding the environmental risks, and the analysis of
such risks, associated with EHW-2.188  Setting aside whether this was
actually the case, the court’s reliance on this point in finding both
NEPA violations to constitute harmless errors appears to add a level
of analysis to the application of the “harmless error standard.”189
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit seemed to require that, to find a
harmful error, the information not disclosed by the agency must
have been capable of enhancing the public’s understanding of the
potential environmental impacts of a project or of the proposing
agency’s analysis of potential risks to the surrounding environ-
ment.190  Although this may be a reasonable analysis for the court
to conduct, the problem with this standard is that the court offers
no guidance about what kind of information sufficiently enhances
public knowledge of potential environmental impacts or of an
agency’s risk assessment of those potential impacts.191  Conse-
quently, applying this requirement in future Ninth Circuit cases in-
volving NEPA violations will likely result in varying and inconsistent
decisions.192
When considering the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
this case, it is important to remember that NEPA, as discussed by
the Supreme Court in Robertson, is fundamentally a procedural stat-
ute.193  In practice, this means NEPA does not compel results in the
form of preventing environmental harm.194  Rather, the statute
merely requires agencies to consider the potential environmental
impacts of their actions and to allow the public to assess agencies’
considerations of those potential impacts.195  The court, in limiting
188. For an explanation of why the court found the nondisclosure of the ap-
pendix information and the Safety Board’s disapproval to be harmless on the basis
of that information’s content, see supra notes 132, 148 and accompanying text.
189. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s “harmless error” standard,
see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
190. For a summary of the Ninth Circuit’s embrace of an elevated “harmful
error” standard, see supra notes 132, 148 and accompanying text.
191. For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning, see supra notes 149-183
and accompanying text.
192. For a description of the court’s problematic conclusion limiting public
oversight of government projects that have the potential to effect environmental
harm, see supra notes 132, 148 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s dialogue in Robertson describing
NEPA as a procedural statute, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
194. For a recounting of NEPA’s reliance on action forcing provisions, see
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of NEPA’s mandate that agencies both consider poten-
tial environmental impacts of proposed projects and disseminate information
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the kind of information that will result in a finding of a non-harm-
less error if not disclosed in an EIS, may incentivize agencies to
disclose less information to the public and to give less weight to
certain kinds of information when evaluating the potential environ-
mental risks of future projects.196  This, in turn, could weaken the
EIS as an action forcing provision, thereby undermining the very
mechanism specifically designed to enable NEPA to effectuate its
overarching goals of environmental protection.197
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about such considerations to the public, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text.
196. For an explanation of how the Ninth Circuit’s holding avails agencies of
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ing text.
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